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THE U.S. INSTITUTIONAL PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKET: A
TURBO TOUR
James T. Bartlett
I. INTRODUCTION
From its origins as a loose federation of informal private investors and
partnerships established in the early 1970s, the Institutional Private Capital
(IPC) industry has emerged as a major force fueling the growth of private
enterprise in the United States. Approximately 250 billion dollars of institu-
tional capital has been assembled to invest in promising companies ranging
from start-ups to large, mature businesses. The robust growth of the domestic
IPC industry has spilled over into international markets. Virtually all of the
major industrial nations now support, to some degree, an IPC infrastructure
of firms and funded pools of private capital.
IPC has become an established asset class with validated returns and so-
phisticated management deeply experienced in private investing. As a result,
U.S. pension funds, endowments, and corporations no longer hesitate to
commit a significant percentage of their assets to IPC (ranging in some cases
up to twenty percent of managed assets). The reason is simple. PC has de-
veloped a proven track record of delivering superior returns over long cycles,
even taking into account the risks inherent in private investing. In a few short
years, it has moved from being a curious phenomenon pursued by a small
fraternity of individual investors and eclectic firms to an institutionalized
business with a powerful impact on the U.S. economy.
I. THE IPC MANAGERS
JPC is controlled by several hundred private partnerships in the United
States. These partnerships are delineated by: a) the amount of capital under
* Mr. Bartlett has been a Managing Director of Primus Venture Partners, a private equity
investment firm based in Cleveland, Ohio, since June 1986. He received a B.A. degree in
histoy from Amherst College and an M.B.A. degree from Harvard University.
Exclusions to this generalization are domestic and foreign bank holding companies and
corporations with private equity subsidiaries (e.g., Intel, GE, IBM). Often, however, these
investors look and act like private partnerships in their management structures and compensa-
tion practices.
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management, b) their particular style of investing, and c) the specific industry
sectors and/or geography they cover.
The largest firms are typically categorized as Leveraged Buyout Funds
(LBO funds) and may have as much as several billions of dollars (U.S.) un-
der management. These finms tend to concentrate on a few large transactions
per year, typically seeking to buy control of divested divisions of public
companies, to purchase large private companies, or to take private heretofore
publicly traded companies. They may commit from under 100 million dollars
to well in excess of one billion dollars to a single transaction. LBO firms are
typically the most astute financial engineers in the industry, relying on inno-
vative financing structures and terms to shape their prospects for superior
returns. Typically, they use leverage (high debt-to-equity ratios) and are riv-
eted on cash flow management in their portfolio companies. Often they are
able to generate returns not by growing enterprises, but by raising cash to
retire debt through rigorous control of operating costs, current assets, and
capital expenditures. LBO funds are quite catholic in their tastes for specific
industrie or geographical settings, seeking first and foremost companies that
can support leverage and that are well-managed. Most important to them is a
sound management team that knows its markets and can generate cash flow,
not a specific industry.
2
Next in line are the smaller private equity investors, often referred to as
middle market firms. They concentrate on smaller companies and smaller
transactions than those sponsored by the larger LBO funds. The same for-
mula applies, however: invest in well-managed businesses with predictable
cash flows that can be leveraged. Some of these smaller firms have concen-
trated on a relatively new investment phenomenon, the so-called "roll-up
strategy." The basic premise is to find a stable base company, preferably with
industry leadership and sound management, operating in a market that is
highly fragmented and characterized by under-managed "mom and pop"
businesses. Using creative financing techniques and an aggressive acquisition
model, they "roll up" a series of like companies then manage them as a
streamilined, centrally controlled enterprise. Recent examples of roll-ups in
the United States include the consolidation of auto body repair shops, funeral
homes, pet food stores, beauty salons, insurance agencies, and automobile
dealerships.
At the more speculative end of the market, defined by the amount of
capital typically under management and the nature of the companies in which
they invest, are the venture capital firms. The entire range of IPC investing is
2 There are exceptions. Some LBO firms are now beginning to concentrate their efforts
by industry, seeking to capitalize on special relationships, management contacts, or industry
expertise to enhance performance.
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at times referred to as venture capital, but this is a misnomer. Venture capi-
talists invest in a wide spectrum of opportunities, from early-stage compa-
nies, often pre-revenues, up to companies with established products and mar-
kets seeking the private equity needed to accelerate growth. Rarely does a
venture capital firm invest in an already publicly traded company. Further, a
venture-backed company in the early going typically avoids debt save for
modest working capital lines. Every capital dollar is earmarked for product
or market development and assembling the necessary organization to manage
growth. Debt is anathema to most venture investors; paying interest is con-
sidered a misallocation of precious capital needed to fuel growth.
In contrast to buyout firms, venture capitalists tend to specialize by in-
dustry sector or, in some cases, focus on a geographic market. Specialization
forces a concentration of talent and experience, where successful investing
requires deep technical expertise to accurately assess trends and evaluate the
odds of a new product's success. Biotechnology and medical devices are two
sectors where a deep understanding of the specific science and the needs of
the marketplace distinguish the successful investor from a gambler. The geo-
graphically focused investor covers the ground intensively, seeking to domi-
nate the sources of investment opportunities in its region. At times, the two
forms of specialization - industry and geography - converge in a single firm.
The declared focus of one successful venture investor I recently visited in an
active Western U.S. market was to invest only in telecommunications com-
panies within 100 miles of Denver.
Most firms in the IPC industry are organized as partnerships, both in legal
form and management style. Competition for good investment ideas is par-
ticularly keen in the U.S. market and is getting more so with each passing
year. To companies needing capital, a swift response ahead of competition
often makes the difference between a winning firm and one with modest re-
sults. Swiftness translates into streamlined decision-making and the ability to
shift resources on a moment's notice. This environment is ideally suited to
the partnership model of management: flat structures, bare bones administra-
tive reporting, team decisions '(as opposed to a chain-of-command), and the
ability to re-balance staff resources weekly or daily if necessary.
IPC industry compensation is attractive by most standards, with a heavy
emphasis on sharing realized gains with limited partners, who are the source
of capital put to work by IPC firms. The owner-managers of IPC partnerships
are motivated to generate attractive returns for their limited partners because
those returns in turn translate into a big payoff for the managers. This align-
ing of interests - you win if I win - has been one of the drivers behind the
growth of IPC in the United States. The potential financial rewards for man-
agers are such that IPC has become one of the two or three most sought after
3
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careers for top-flight business school graduates and first rate managers from
other financial sectors. At the same time, by producing stellar returns for
their limited partners, these same firms have satisfied their "clients" by
proving over a long period that they can deliver outstanding results net of all
fees and expenses.
II. THE IPC INVESTOR: PROFILES AND TRENDS
Who are the investors in IPC? Three decades ago the answer was simple:
they were wealthy individuals, an occasional insurance company, some cor-
porations, and a scattering of bank holding companies. Pension funds, most
international investors, foundations, and college and university endowments
were conspicuously absent. At that time the "prudent man rule" and the legal
restraints imposed upon trustees compelled to act as fiduciaries deterred all
but the hardiest institutional investors from playing the game. There were
few managers with established track records, and therefore little hard evi-
dence to support a recommendation to invest in an IPC fund. Until the late
1970s and early 1980s, relatively few investors understood the arcane legal
and financial issues embedded in most private equity transactions.
The 1980s changed all that, as did the working through of ERISA regula-
tions and rules governing the investment policies of pension funds. As more
firms became visibly successful and could demonstrate consistent perform-
ance over a series of funds, larger amounts of capital were allocated to them.
A classic example is the New York firm of Warburg, Pincus & Co. They
raised their first fund in the early 1970s with what seemed a princely sum of
fifty million dollars in committed capital. In 1988, Primus collaborated with
Warburg in an investment where they ultimately committed sixty-five mil-
lion dollars to just one portfolio company. Warburg's most recent fund,
closed late last year, was five billion dollars. Our experience, although on a
smaller scale, illustrates the same point: our first fund raised in 1984 was
thirty million dollars, our most recent fund, in 1997, is 165 million dollars.
The appeal of TPC investments in a balanced portfolio has become in-
creasingly apparent. These investments are longer term in nature, offering the
prospects for returns in the range of 500 basis points above the Standard and
Poors 500 Index. They add risk to a portfolio, but since most IPC investment
vehicles (primarily investment partnerships) have a large number of high
potential companies in a portfolio, the odds of losing money on an IPC in-
vestment are relatively small. In most endowments or pension funds, the
amount of capital committed to IPC as an asset class can also be controlled to
3 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994).
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 25 [1999], Iss. , Art. 29
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol25/iss/29
Bartlett-THE U.S. INSTITUTIONAL PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKET
whatever level the trustees or managers deem appropriate depending on the
special needs of the institution. Thus, not only has the management of IPC in
the United States become institutionalized, but so has the asset class for in-
vestors. These two conditions point to a continuing demand for PC invest-
ment vehicles operated by seasoned fund managers.
Backing up this statement, in 1982 $1.8 billion of new institutional
money was committed to IPC in the United States. At the end of the 1980s,
between eight billion dollars and fourteen billion dollars was being commit-
ted annually to IPC-managed funds. In the past three years, 1996 to 1998,
thirty-seven, fifty-four, and eighty-five billion dollars, respectively, was
committed. In twenty years there has been a staggering increase in the avail-
ability of IPC in the United States, with a significant percentage of it going
into LBO or acquisition funds. It is estimated that over 250 billion dollars of
capital is currently lodged with all categories of PC managers. What better
measurement to underpin the statement that IPC has become a major force in
the U.S. economy?
IV.VENTURE CAPITAL, A TRUE ENGINE FOR GROWTH
An impressive percentage of PC funds under management resides with
the venture capital firms, but it is nowhere near the amount of capital man-
aged by LBO firms. Does this mean that venture capital has less of an impact
on the economy and on wealth creation? I believe the opposite can be argued.
First, a quick tour of the facts is in order. Venture capital funds at the end
of 1997 in the aggregate controlled roughly forty-six billion dollars of IPC in4
the funds under management. I estimate this number is presently well more
than fifty billion dollars. Putting that number in perspective, at the beginning
of the 1980s, seven to ten billion dollars was under management. By the end
of the 1980s, that figure had grown to thirty to thirty-five billion dollars. Cor-
respondingly, this huge increase in the amount of venture capital under pro-
fessional TPC management has meant that the number of firns managing
venture funds has increased dramatically. So has the average size of venture
funds; in the early 1980s, a fifty million dollar fund was considered large.
Today, funds that are a multiple of 100 million dollars are commonplace.
As one would expect, disbursements out of venture capital funds into
private companies have also increased dramatically. In the early 1980s, a
record year would have chalked up two to three billion dollars of new port-
folio company commitments. In 1996 through 1998, eight billion, eleven
billion, and fourteen billion dollars, respectively, was committed to new
4 1998 statistics are not yet available. Normally they are released well into the second
quarter of the following year.
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ventures or supporting existing companies. Over that same period, approxi-
mately twenty billion dollars of funding through Initial Public Offerings
(IPOs) was added to the privately funded capital invested in venture-backed
enterprises. These sums are truly enormous when one considers that most of
these companies did not exist five years ago, and that many of them have yet
to achieve revenues in the 100 million dollar range, let alone significant
profits.
How productive is this floodtide of private capital? Judging from the re-
cent phenomenal growth in the value of Internet-related companies, substan-
tial wealth has certainly been created, at least on paper. But what about job
creation, growth in research and development dollars, and other measures of
lasting contributions to the economy?
. 5
VentureOne Corporation, a database management company reporting on
private capital transactions, completed a study two years ago on the impact of
venture-backed companies on the U.S. economy. The results were quite re-
vealing, and included the following conclusions about venture-backed com-
panies: 1) They grew at thirty-eight percent compounded in 1991-1995 ver-
sus 3.5% for the Fortune 500 companies and 4.2% for the U.S. economy. 2)
Their research budgets compounded annually at thirty-three percent versus
twelve percent for the Fortune 500. 3) On average, the survey companies
added over 150 employees each in their first eight years of operations.
Looked at in another time frame, during 1991-1995 their employment grew
at a thirty-three percent compounded average. The Fortune 500 had a nega-
tive growth rate in employment of -3.6%.
6
These are compelling statistics that speak to lasting economic impact. Not
only is wealth being created for investors and other owners, but jobs are also
being created that underlie the long-term health of the U.S. economy. For the
most part, these are highly desirable jobs. When one looks at the industries in
which venture capital is investing, they have the following common charac-
teristics: they grow rapidly and they attract educated and well-trained em-
ployees. They are largely service-based, and they have little or no environ-
mental impact. These industries include software and information technol-
ogy, telecommunications, healthcare services, business services, and bio-
technology.7 What developed or developing nation would not covet such
newly created employment opportunities for its own workforce?
5 VentureOne was acquired by Reuters News Service in January of 1999. See Reuters
Acquires VentureOne Corporation, REUTERS, Jan. 11, 1999 (visited June 14, 1999)
<http://www.reuters.com/aboutreuters/ newsreleases/release.htm>.
6 For more information, see generally NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS'N, THE SEVENTH
ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VENTURE CAPITAL (1999).
7 These are ranked in order by the amount of private capital invested in 1998.
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Venture capital has become a powerful force driving some of the most
rapidly expanding sectors of our economy. Perhaps most relevant, it has been
the capital juggernaut funding the swarm of companies that are riding the
Internet wave and its closely aligned, skyrocketing world of E-commerce.
8
Very few of these companies that have made it from start-up through to pub-
lic ownership have done so without professional venture capital support. In
the Internet area, household names such as Netscape, Yahoo!, America On-
line, Excite, Lycos, Cisco Systems, Sun MicroSystems, GeoCities, and
Broadcast.com are just a few that spring to mind. In E-commerce, Ama-
zon.com, eBay.com, E*Trade Group, Buy.com, Mail.com, and iVillage.com
are just a few of the billion-dollar-plus market capitalization companies that
attracted early investors from the venture community. The list goes on, and it
is increasing daily as a flood of new ideas and companies find venture spon-
sorship.
It is rare in the United States today that any economic sector relying on
the development or application of technology is not touched by the venture
capital community. Based on the trends in funding and the willingness of
institutional investors to place increasingly larger bets on venture capital
managers, it is unlikely the impact of venture capital will diminish anytime
soon. Indeed, all IPC markets are apt to continue expanding as long as there
are decent opportunities in which to invest and investors who believe.
V. A SNAPSHOT: WHAT'S HAPPENING IN TODAY'S IPC MARKETS?
In addition to understanding the broad trends at work in the U.S.-based
IPC markets, we should explore briefly the state of those markets today. I
have already indicated the size of the capital pool available to invest and the
rate of investment, particularly in the venture capital sector.9 But what are
some of the other current trends that are impacting IPC managers and their
investment activities?
LBO funds and their middle-market counterparts are active, but they are
not as fully committed as they were two to three years ago. During the recent
run-up in the U.S. stock market, valuations for public companies of all kinds
have soared. This trend has had the effect of causing large company or divi-
sional spinout transactions to rise in price, a direct "trickle down" effect of
8 Companies classified as "Intemet" in the venture capital world are those that provide
the infrastructure and tools for using the Internet. 'E-commerce" companies are those that
provide products or services over the Internet to both consumer and business customers.
No reliable statistics are published on the rate of investment by LBO and middle-
market funds.
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the public markets' rising multiples over the past five years.10 To quantify
this shift in values, transactions that were valued in 1994-95 at four to five
times Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) are now being valued at
nine to ten times EBIT, or roughly a doubling in five years. Since entry
prices, or what one pays for a company, are a key determinant in the ultimate
return potential on the investment, this change has dampened some of the
enthusiasm for LBO transactions that existed in the late 1980s to mid-1990s.
The unprecedented amount of capital now residing in LBO funds is an-
other factor contributing to an upward price spiral in the buyout sector. Esti-
mates as high as 200 billion dollars of available capital for buyouts suggest
there may be too much capital chasing a finite number of transactions. If this
is the case, and I believe it is, the effect on pricing in the LBO market is ob-
vious: continuing upward pressure.
In addition to pricing, the competitive landscape has also shifted. Many
corporations, in their role as strategic buyers, enjoy high multiples on stock
that they can exchange for the assets or stock of privately held companies.
Corporate cash flows are also near all-time highs, with many companies en-
joying relatively low debt-to-capital ratios and high liquidity. As a result,
these competitors can "pay up" in either cash or stock for businesses pos-
sessing strategic relevance. They are clearly fueling the price spiral in LBO
transactions. If this trend continues, the returns for LBO fund investors may
well drift downward; high entry prices almost invariably result in lower re-
turns when an investment rolls over.
The venture capital sector is experiencing similar pressures. Tradition-
ally, pricing for early-stage or growth equity financings has not been as
closely linked to multiples in the public markets. Recently, however, the
trends appear to be converging. One reason may be the outlandish public
market multiples bein ilaccorded Internet or E-commerce companies. Their
market capitalizations, now measured as a multiple of revenues, not profits,
have reached historic proportions. As of late March 1999, the following
companies were trading at the indicated multiples of revenue: Amazon.com
(sixteen times), eBay.com (147 times), and E*Trade Group (seventeen
times).
Any entrepreneur establishing an Internet company is well-aware of this
phenomenon. In fact, he or she cannot help but notice it, given the extensive
10 "Multiple" is shorthand for the Price-to-Earnings or P/E ratio paid for the equity secu-
rities of traded companies.
11 "Market capitalization" is determined by multiplying the sum of all shares outstanding
times the price per share. For companies with multiple equity securities outstanding (e.g.
Preferred and Common stock), the market capitalization is the sum of all equity securities
times their respective prices per share or per unit.
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 25 [1999], Iss. , Art. 29
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol25/iss/29
Bartlett-THE U.S. INSTITUTIONAL PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKET
press coverage on the Internet and its more visible players. Entrepreneurs and
promoters of start-up investments are, therefore, demanding correspondingly
higher valuations for their ideas (the company is yet to take form in most
instances) in raising an initial round of venture capital.
Offsetting this trend in the venture capital sector, there is no shortage of
new ideas or technologies in which to invest. Again, the Internet and its re-
lated E-commerce world have provided a burgeoning stream of investment
proposals. As a proxy for the robustness of the flow of ideas in the Inter-
net/E-commerce sector, in a single two-week period this spring, BT Alex• . 12
Brown reported in its E-Tailing Review fourteen completed IPOs and forty
more pending. To feed this public financing activity, ten to twenty times the
number of transactions were probably being completed in a like period ear-
lier on.
Other industries are also attracting huge amounts of private capital,
among them information technology and telecommunications. Information
technology opportunities come from the demand for data management tools
to cope with the information needs of our society at all levels. It is difficult to
imagine any institution, whether it be a school system, a corporation, or a
healthcare complex, that is not either overhauling or updating its information
system. I serve on the board of trustees of an art museum and a liberal arts
college, and I am a director of eight companies, both private and publicly
held. Every one of these entities is currently heavily invested in information
systems upgrades or a total overhaul.
Aside from the highly publicized Y2K problem, these needs are on-
going. Unless an organization updates its management information systems
every two to three years, it will likely fall behind in its field. At the beginning
of the 1990s, the relevant time interval was probably closer to seven or eight
years. This fundamental rate of change attracts entrepreneurs with better
ways of coping with data management and systems issues, which in tm
translates into a need for growth capital.
A similar trend is emerging in telecommunications, where the demand for
ever-increasing amounts of bandwidth is being driven by a global explosion
in both voice and data transmission. Tying these trends together, the use of
the Internet for transmitting data is having a huge impact on the telecommu-
nications industry and the demand for Internet protocol (IP) capacity.13 This
fact is fueling a surge in private financings for telecommunications compa-
nies seeking capital to expand their high-speed data networks worldwide.
12 E-Tailing Review is a bi-weekly report issued by BT Alex Brown, Inc. on financing
activity in E-commerce.
IP is the standard format for transmitting data over the Internet.
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The recently initiated overhaul of the worldwide regulatory telecommu-
nications framework is another force spawning a new generation of compa-
nies eager to compete with the monopolistic Poste Telephone & Telegraph
Telecommunications companies (PTTs) in .most foreign countries, calling for
• . 14 "..
private capital to get them started. U.S.-based IPC managers are partici-
pating in, if not leading, private investment in these companies, recognizing
that the same wealth creation surge is apt to occur in the foreign telecommu-
nications markets that took place here during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Taken together, these developments point to an almost boundless demand for
private capital. It is not likely that venture capitalists and other private equity
sources will be facing a shortage of new ideas to fund in the coming two dec-
ades.
VI. A MICRO VIEW OF ONE VENTURE FIRM, PRIMUS VENTURE PARTNERS
For the reader not familiar with the workings of a venture capital firm, it
might prove instructive to examine one firm in some depth to develop a bet-
ter understanding of how IPC investors approach their work. My firm, Pri-
mus Venture Partners, based in Cleveland, Ohio, is a case example I obvi-
ously know very well. Let me share some insights into our firm, including
how we are organized, where we concentrate our resources, and how we go
about selecting investments.
We established Primus in 1983 as a venture capital firm with a geo-
graphic focus. Our chosen marketplace was Ohio and the upper Midwestern
states. At the time, there was little venture capital managed in formal pools
between New York and Chicago; thus the Midwest (excluding Chicago) was
considered virgin territory. Our investment thesis was that, by establishing
our presence here, we would attract investment proposals from
owner/managers who preferred working with the home team rather than turn
to a major money center partner for capital.
Our first venture fund was thirty million dollars in size with exclusively
institutional investors, all from the Midwest area. We followed our early
strategy and maintained a tight geographic focus, not really identifying in-
dustries that were a priority. This strategy worked for a number of years, but
at the same time, we were building experience in four or five industries
where we had realized first-tier returns and were developing a following
among those industries' entrepreneurs. As more IPC capital began to flow
into our region, we knew competition would become keener within our core
14 This phenomenon occurred in the United States, beginning with the breakup of AT&T
mandated by the Justice Department in the early 1980s.
10
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market. Hence, we concentrated on developing expertise that would ulti-
mately lead us to a national focus.
In 1987, we raised our second fund of approximately seventy-five million
dollars, and followed that fund with a third fund of like size in 1993. Our
presently active fund (from an investing viewpoint) was raised in 1997 with
165 million dollars of committed capital. In one decade, Primus moved up
approximately fivefold in fund size under management, reaching a total of
340 million dollars under management for all funds. During this period, we
moved away from geographic focus to concentrating nationally and interna-
tionally on five industry sectors, all proven money-makers: medi-
cal/healthcare, information technology (including telecommunications), con-
sumer/retail (now almost exclusively concentrated in E-commerce), financial
services, and for-profit education and training (largely over the Internet). All
of these industry sectors share some common themes: rapid growth, serving
very large and dynamic markets, and managements that provide the neces-
sary entrepreneurial firepower to build successful companies.
Primus has also shifted its focus in terms of company stage at the point of
initial investment. We have always done early-stage investing; we are a
venture capital firm, and that is part of our work. But in earlier times, we also
invested in mature businesses operating in slow-growth industries as well.
Now that pricing pressures and competition in this arena more typically cov-
ered by the middle-market firms are much more intense, we have moved
"down market" in our focus, exclusively investing in early and growth-stage
smaller and younger companies.
Our evolution from a geocentric, all-stages investor to an industry-
focused firm doing early to growth-equity investing typifies the pattern of
development for successful competitors in our industry. The fast pace of
change occurring in the markets where we invest has spilled over into our
way of doing business. You either adapt swiftly or you die.
When Primus makes an investment, we invariably key on four core ele-
ments that must be present if we are to commit capital:'
5
Proven management - There must be a team in place that has a track
record of successfully building companies in the specific industry
where we seek to invest.
Signiflcant management ownership - We insist on management
having an equity stake in the business. If they succeed, they will
build considerable personal wealth for themselves. Their incentives
must be parallel with ours, that is, focused on building shareholder
is Primus has invested in over eighty-five companies in fourteen years.
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equity. We are proud of the fact that our managements in Primus
companies that have either gone public or been merged in the past
ten years have accumulated personal wealth in excess of three-
quarters of a billion dollars.
16
Proprietary advantage coupled with market leadership potential --
We look for unusual if not unique product and market opportunities
that, if successfully managed, have the potential to create an industry
leader of significant size. A good example is STERIS Corporation,
now the world leader in infection prevention systems for hospitals.
We invested in STERIS when it had three employees. It now has
revenues approaching 800 million dollars.
Superior market opportunity - We invest only in companies that are
serving, or plan to serve, large and rapidly growing markets. In order
to build significant value in a company, it must have size and large
profit potential. We will not invest in companies whose prospects are
limited by the size of the markets they serve. In passing, one of the
inherent appeals of E-commerce and Internet-related investments is
the enormous potential for companies that "get it right" in terms of a
business model and market focus. Demand will ultimately sweep
them to a very large revenue base if they can find the right service or
product niche.
On the reverse side, we have a set of time-tested and painfully developed
negative screens as well. For example, we will not invest in technologies
where there is no management to take a proven idea to market. We do not
invest behind consultants or staff persons as CEOs. And we do not favor
commodity or cyclical businesses that lack linear growth potential.
How do we organize for making investments, then follow them through
to a profit for our limited partners? We are a partnership and follow the
model discussed earlier. We have a flat organization of six partners with
seven others doing the investment work of the firm (out of seventeen total
employees). Each week, we meet to discuss current investment proposals
circulating in the firm and assign priorities. For the most promising, we pack
resources into due diligence or negotiation of terms in order to ensure we
have the best prospect for completing the investment. If priorities shift be-
cause of new opportunities that arise weekly, we will re-allocate staff to con-
16 This figure is measured at the time of an IPO, sale, or merger of their companies. We
have no records on the after-market activities of our managers or their personal investment
programs.
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centrate on the ones we want to win. We operate as teams. There are no line
reporting relationships at Primus in the usual corporate sense. Once an in-
vestment is on the books, we then follow it through board representation,
with the original team on call in case a major opportunity should present it-
self (acquisition, new product initiative, etc.). In short, we are a fleet organi-
zation, highly flexible, and geared to rapid response.
Primus is not unlike scores of like firms in the venture capital segment of
the IPC market. We periodically re-create ourselves by adapting to changing
conditions or taking advantage of long-range market trends. We are quick-
responders by nature and in our way of doing business. But at the same time,
we are patient and willing to work with our portfolio companies to build
long-term value for all shareholders over many years.
VII. CONCLUSION
Closing out my comments on the bigger picture, the IPC market in the
United States is booming. In two-plus decades it has moved from an informal
club of shirt-sleeved investors to a sophisticated, professionally managed
industry. Nothing else in modem times rivals the speed with which this in-
dustry has reached such an important position in its impact on the world's
largest economy. The U.S. market was the industry's seedbed and its labo-
ratory. Now that many proven patterns of successful investment and man-
agement strategies for IPC have been validated, this phenomenon is spread-
ing internationally. Hopefully, IPC will ultimately have the same lasting ef-
fect on growth and prosperity in the rest of the world as it has had in the
United States.
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